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overvIew — Physician profiling, that is, the comparison of the health 
care services used by a physician’s patients to average service use or an-
other benchmark, has been proposed as a way to improve Medicare. It has 
been used by private health plans and physician groups to identify both 
efficient practice patterns and the physicians who practice efficiently. The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) have recommended that Medicare 
adopt physician profiling to slow spending growth and improve efficiency. 
Recent legislation would mandate that Medicare employ profiling. This 
issue brief reviews MedPAC and GAO’s analyses of profiling, concerns 
about using this type of information, and the obstacles in incorporating 
profiling in the Medicare program.
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Physician Profiling:  
Can Medicare Paint an  
Accurate Picture?
Comparisons of physician practice styles often point out variations in 
prescribing and treatment regimens that translate into large cost differ-
ences in caring for apparently similar patients. Profiling is a methodology 
for compiling data on the health care services received by a physician’s 
patients to compare an individual physician’s practice with a standard or 
norm. This methodology has been used to identify physicians who have 
higher or lower than expected resource use given the identified needs of 
their patients. This information can then be used to inform efforts to steer 
patients to lower cost physicians. Profiling has also been used to encour-
age high resource-use physicians to adopt practice styles of their lower 
resource-use colleagues.
Profiling has captured the attention of federal health policymakers in 
their pursuit of ways to improve the quality of care provided to Medicare 
beneficiaries while slowing the unrelenting growth in spending. Recent 
proposed legislation, the Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act 
(H.R. 3162), would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
“develop and implement a mechanism to measure resource use on a per 
capita and an episode basis in order to provide confidential feedback to 
physicians in the Medicare program on how their practice patterns compare 
to physicians generally, both in the same locality as well as nationally.”1 
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) also has indicated 
that it will report on providing feedback to physicians with profiling data 
in the fall of 2007.2
The interest among Congress and the executive branch in the use of profil-
ing in the Medicare program raises many questions.3 What is the objective 
of the profiling effort, and what would indicate its success? What measures 
of resource use would be compiled? How would the standard or norm be 
established? Would it be a national or local standard? How would patient 
resource use be assigned to a particular physician? How would the data 
account for differences in the mix of patients treated by physicians and 
the differences in severity even across patients with the same conditions? 
What type of information would be fed back to physicians? How would 
physicians who do not treat many Medicare patients be assessed? How 
would physicians be expected to respond to this information? These and 
many more philosophical and technical questions need to be addressed 
in designing a profiling program for Medicare. 
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profIlIng to alter patIent choIce of 
provIder or phySIcIan practIce patternS 
Some private health plans have tried to rein in the often large differences in 
practice patterns across physicians to hold down spending, either by influ-
encing patient choice of provider or by affecting physicians’ resource use. 
One approach has been to give patients financial incentives through reduced 
co-payments to choose lower cost physicians. Their choice of physician may 
also be influenced by public reports of provider quality and efficiency mea-
sures that health plans make available. Public reports as well as confidential 
feedback have also been used by health plans to influence physician resource 
use by highlighting lower cost practice styles and the resource use of other 
physicians for similar patients. This feedback may be reinforced through 
financial incentives. For example, in health plan networks, lower resource-
use physicians have been given preferred status, higher fees, or differential 
salaries or bonuses based on efficiency measures. 
Physician groups have used profiling as 
part of their internal clinical and quality 
management efforts. Profiling efforts 
have provided the information to control 
or reduce spending on a patient popu-
lation, which can help them achieve a 
favorable position with payers or increase their margins from capitated 
contracts. Information about practice styles has been used to educate their 
physician members about more efficient or effective methods of care or 
patterns of service use. Comparisons of a physician’s practice style to his 
or her peers have also been used to distribute group income or to reward 
more efficient providers. A physician group that can demonstrate its ef-
ficiency relative to other groups in an area may have an edge in negotiat-
ing favorable terms and fees with payers. They may also profit more from 
capitated contracts than less efficient groups. 
To facilitate the adoption of profiling, the Massachusetts Group Insurance 
Commission (GIC), the public agency that provides insurance to the state’s 
employees, retirees, and dependents, has begun a multi-year effort to de-
velop physician-specific quality and efficiency data.4 It has aggregated the 
claims data from all of the health plans that it contracts with. The health 
plans under contract to the GIC are required to use these data to develop 
tiered physician and hospital networks. A tiered network typically includes 
designated preferred providers; other providers may be non-preferred or 
even excluded from coverage in the health plan. The tiers associate lower 
patient co-payments with more efficient providers. The intention of the 
GIC is to have plans help patients become better consumers and encourage 
physicians to become more efficient. Although it is too soon to document 
any results, this effort has demonstrated that it is feasible to aggregate 
claims across plans to develop the data for profiling and that a large health 
care purchaser can require the use of profiling.
the gIc effort has demonstrated that it is fea-
sible to aggregate claims across plans to develop 
the data for profiling and that a large health care 
purchaser can require the use of profiling.
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the deSIgn wIll affect the reSultS
The methods to identify efficient providers vary and the definitions of key 
concepts differ, which complicates the development of successful profiling 
efforts. Profiling requires aggregating health care claims data by patient and 
then associating patients with the physicians who care for them. The data for 
each physician are compiled so that the resource use profile of an individual 
physician’s patients can be compared with a standard. The standard may be 
the average resource use of all physicians in a group or a benchmark. 
The design of the profiling effort is likely to affect the results, that is, which 
physicians are identified as having efficient or inefficient practice patterns. 
Critical design questions include which services to include and how to as-
sign patients to a physician. For example, should only physician-provided 
services be counted or should all services be included, such as hospitaliza-
tions and pharmaceuticals? While the physician may directly control the 
number of follow-up office visits for a patient, an individual physician has 
much less control over the resources used during a hospital stay. During 
a course of treatment or over a period of time, a patient is likely to see 
several physicians.5 A profiling strategy may assign all claims for a patient 
to a primary care physician responsible for the majority of office visits to 
that patient. Alternative strategies may assign to a physician only those 
services that were provided or ordered directly by that doctor. 
The manner of grouping claims, either over a period of time or for an 
episode of care related to a particular condition, may also influence the 
results or how the profiling information may be used. Aggregating claims 
for a patient over a period of time, called a per-capita approach, allows 
comparisons when data are limited and describes differences in per-person 
health care spending across geographic regions or populations. With a per-
capita approach, the results are relatively easy to understand, most claims 
can be assigned to a physician, and analyses can identify areas or issues 
that may require further elucidation. The results, however, generally do 
not include information that is specific enough for individual physicians 
to identify practices that, if changed, could make them more efficient.
Profiling based on episodes of care produces information that may be more 
“actionable” for an individual physician. A patient’s claims for services re-
lated to a particular condition are aggregated, and then the patient episode 
is assigned to a physician. For example, all services for a patient related to 
the treatment of diabetes and its complications would be grouped. The epi-
sodes for a physician would be aggregated so that the physician’s treatment 
of patients with diabetes could be compared with the treatment of similar 
patients of other physicians. This method is likely to yield more information 
on the factors contributing to differences in physician efficiency. It can help 
tease out whether one physician’s patients receive more diagnostic services 
or more expensive pharmaceuticals than the benchmark, for example. This 
is information that can be used by a physician to determine the behaviors 
that could be changed to bring the profile in line with the benchmark.
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Per-capita and episode profiling approaches yield particularly useful in-
formation when used together. This is illustrated by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in an analysis of seemingly contradictory 
findings.6 MedPAC’s per-capita analysis identified Miami as a high resource-
use area and Minneapolis as a low resource-use 
area. Yet its analysis of coronary artery disease 
episodes in the two locations revealed that the 
average costs for an episode of care for coronary 
artery disease was $2,691 in Miami compared 
with $3,507 in Minneapolis. The episode analy-
sis indicated a more expensive pattern of care 
in Minneapolis, with a higher hospitalization rate and more treatment- 
oriented services, which are costlier than the diagnostic services that were 
more prevalent in the Miami episodes. Even with lower episode costs, the 
Miami physicians had higher per capita spending, however, because they 
were more likely to identify patients as having coronary artery disease. 
That is, there were more episodes. In Miami, patients with coronary artery 
disease had an average of almost three episodes, compared with about two 
in Minneapolis. This indicates that physicians in Minneapolis focused their 
more intensive style on patients who were more likely to need treatment 
for coronary artery disease. 
accounting for patient differences
Differences in patient resource use are often dismissed with statements such 
as “my patients are sicker” or “I provide higher quality care.” Clearly, some 
patients do need more medical services than others and some physicians do 
treat more complex patients. Without adequate adjustments for the com-
plexity or health care needs of a physician’s patients, physicians with sicker 
patients would appear to be less efficient than others, and physicians with 
fewer complex patients would seem more efficient. This could compromise 
access to care for needier patients if physicians selected less complex patients 
to help ensure that their profile showed high relative efficiency.
Accounting for differences in the mix and complexity of a physician’s 
patients, sometimes called risk adjustment, is an important and difficult 
aspect of profiling. Although risk adjustment techniques have improved 
significantly in recent years, they may not be fully adequate and are often 
the subject of controversy. For instance, it is likely that a patient with a 
prior history of heart problems requires more resources to treat than one 
without this history, but how much more? Someone who has not followed 
a prescribed medical regimen may incur higher expenses than a more 
compliant patient, but is noncompliance a factor that the physician should 
be responsible for changing, or is it out of the physician’s control? 
Similarly, profiling information needs to account for differences in patient 
outcomes. A lower resource-use profile may not be desirable if it results in in-
adequate care. Providing less therapy after a joint replacement, for example, 
accounting for differences in the mix and 
complexity of a physician’s patients, some-
times called risk adjustment, is an impor-
tant and difficult aspect of profiling.
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could reduce the costs for an episode of care. This would not necessarily 
reflect a more efficient delivery pattern, however, unless patient outcomes 
were the same for those who received less therapy. A comparison without 
accounting for outcomes could falsely appear more efficient. 
acceptance of profiling
The accuracy of the data used to construct physician profiles will affect 
the results and the success of profiling efforts. A report on physician 
profiling indicated that “information perceived as inaccurate by physi-
cians will not motivate them to seek cost and quality improvements in 
their practice patterns.”7 Most profiling efforts rely exclusively on billing 
data or claims, which would include the services provided and possibly 
diagnostic information, as well as date of service and the demographic 
information needed to link claims by patient and provider. Some have 
argued that without more detailed clinical or demographic information, 
risk adjustment would not be adequate. Another critical issue is whether 
there is an adequate number of patients or episodes to accurately describe 
a physician’s practice. Various efforts are underway to define adequate 
sample sizes and to ensure the accuracy of data. Concerns remain, however, 
that a physician’s profile could be distorted by an aberrant case. 
Acceptance of profiling by physicians will also depend on how profiling 
is to be used. Physicians may find private feedback—when a physician 
receives a report comparing that physician’s results and those of a reference 
group—to be the most acceptable use of profiling. Profiling techniques that 
involve the public release of results or that incorporate financial incentives 
may be quite a different matter. Plans may report profiling data to influ-
ence patients or other providers to choose the most efficient physicians. 
Plans may receive the strongest objections to profiling when financial 
incentives are involved, particularly from any physician who received 
less-than-optimal results. In the St. Louis area, for example, the largest 
local hospital system and the state medical society helped stop an effort 
by a large insurer to tier physicians in that region.8 A similar effort in New 
York is being challenged by the state attorney general because of concerns 
about the adequacy of the data and potential conflict of interest due to the 
health plan’s interest in steering patients to the lowest cost providers.9
phySIcIan profIlIng wIth medIcare data
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) demonstrated that Medi-
care claims data can be used to compare efficiency across physicians.10 
GAO indicated that the comparative physician information developed 
through profiling holds promise in slowing spending growth. In each of 
the 12 metropolitan areas GAO studied, there were generalist physicians 
who had overly expensive or inefficient practice styles in treating their 
Medicare patients, and some areas had much higher shares of inefficient 
physicians than others.11 (See Figure 1, next page, for a comparison of two 
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Physicians with overly expensive practice 
styles had more overly expensive patients 
than expected.
In Miami, 20.9 percent of physicians had 
overly expensive practice styles.
In Albuquerque, 2 percent of physicians 
had overly expensive practice styles.





of the areas studied.) Inefficient physicians were defined as physicians 
whose patients had extremely high resource use relative to their peers’ 
patients. GAO found that patients treated by inefficient physicians were 
“15 percent more likely to have been hospitalized, 57 percent more likely 
to have been hospitalized multiple times, and 51 percent more likely to 
have used home health services” than similar patients seen by other phy-
sicians. They were also “10 percent less likely to have been admitted to a 
skilled nursing facility.”12 
MedPAC has conducted extensive analyses of profiling and the software 
used in determining episodes of care.13 MedPAC’s report on alternative 
mechanisms for controlling Medicare physician expenditures included 
an analysis of the use of profiling to identify physician outliers.14 They 
noted that fewer than 2 percent of physicians accounted for 7.5 percent of 
Medicare’s total physician payments for 2005. To conduct their analysis, 
MedPAC aggregated claims data across episodes of care to show how 
physician service use could be compared across patients with the same 
condition. As an example, they compared the costs and services of patients 
with stage 1 hypertension of one Boston cardiologist with the average cost 
and service use of similar patients of all Boston cardiologists. The analysis 
revealed that the selected cardiologist’s cost of care was $623, compared 
to the average of $357, in part due to providing 14 office visits compared 
with the average of 11 visits for other cardiologists in the area. 
Source: Adapted from GAO, “Medicare: Focus 
on Physician Practice Patterns Can Lead to 
Greater Program Efficiency,” GAO-07-307, 
April 2007; available at www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d07307.pdf.
physicians with overly expensive  
practice Styles in miami and albuquerque
the proportion of overly expensive patients — those with costs in the 
top 20th percentile of the cost distribution of similar patients — varied 
significantly across the areas examined by gao. For example, in Miami, 
28 percent of the study patients were overly expensive, compared to 
13 percent of the patients in albuquerque.  
fIgure 1
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CMS is pursuing physician profiling as a strategy for the Medicare pro-
gram. In recent testimony before Congress, Acting Deputy Administrator 
Herb Kuhn said, “We are investigating ways to measure individual physi-
cian resource use that links quality in the provision of care to Medicare 
beneficiaries and encourages physicians to focus on efficiency. A goal of 
resource use measurement is to provide information that is meaningful, 
actionable, and fair to physicians in order to reduce inefficient practice pat-
terns.”15 In comments on the GAO report, CMS Acting Administrator Leslie 
Norwalk wrote, “…given the role of physicians in driving total Medicare 
spending, there is opportunity to increase the efficiency of the Medicare 
program by measuring and reporting on physician resource use.”16
ISSueS wIth profIlIng  
In the medIcare program
It would be possible for Medicare to distribute information on an individual 
physician’s practice patterns in comparison to others, much as CMS pro-
vides data on quality indicators for individual hospitals, skilled nursing 
facilities, dialysis facilities, and home health agencies. The measurement 
of physician efficiency and the methodological and risk adjustment issues 
it entails, however, are much more complex. These methodological issues 
would require difficult decisions about which claims data to aggregate, 
careful risk adjustment to ensure the accuracy of comparisons, and an 
understanding of clinical complexity and variation in practice. The gen-
erally smaller sample sizes of individual physician practices and lack of 
consensus of appropriate practice patterns complicate these efforts. 
One approach that has been considered is to use profiling to refine 
Medicare’s sustainable growth rate (SGR), Medicare’s method for updat-
ing physician fees. Medicare’s SGR has been called a blunt instrument 
that fails to distinguish between fees paid to frugal physicians and fees 
to profligate ones. Physician profiles could be used to refine fee updates, 
with lower updates to “outlier” physicians who have high utilization 
profiles or physicians who have higher growth in resource use. As in-
dicated by MedPAC, “The major advantage of measuring individual 
physician resource use is that it addresses the flaw in the SGR of treating 
all physicians equally. An outlier policy promotes individual physician 
accountability and will enable physicians to more readily see a link be-
tween their actions and their payment.”17 
The wide geographic variation in practice styles means that defining the 
standard for comparison or the definition of an outlier physician would 
be especially difficult. Should national standards or local standards be 
incorporated into a Medicare profiling effort? A national standard would 
require physicians in higher use areas, such as Miami, to change more 
than physicians in lower use areas, such as Albuquerque. Local standards 
would reduce any disruption in service use or practice, but would also 
lessen any impact of the use of profiling. 
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Incorporating financial incentives would raise the stakes and introduce 
additional concerns to using physician profiling in Medicare. Chang-
ing Medicare so that it could tie financial incentives to the efficiency of 
care would also be a fundamental shift in how the program interacts 
with providers. Because Medicare is such a large, public payer, it exerts 
more influence over the health care market than any other payer. Thus, 
any actions that incorporate financial incentives could have substantial 
effects on the financial viability of a physician practice, particularly a 
small or Medicare-dependent practice. This could raise concerns about 
Medicare’s special responsibility to maintain access. Because its 42 million 
beneficiaries are throughout the country and 
are likely to be more vulnerable than other 
insured populations, Medicare needs to ensure 
that enough providers are available and that 
their geographic distribution meets the needs 
of its beneficiaries. 
Medicare also has a special responsibility to ensure freedom of choice for 
its beneficiaries. The Medicare fee-for-service program was originally based 
on the tenet that it would not interfere with the practice of medicine and 
that beneficiaries could maintain their choice of provider. Using profiling 
to give patients financial incentives to choose one physician over another 
could be perceived as limiting freedom of choice. Incorporating profiling 
in such a way that some providers could not or would not continue to 
participate in Medicare could also be viewed limiting a physician’s abil-
ity to participate in the public program. Although provider participation 
is not guaranteed, exclusion in this way would be a major change to the 
Medicare program.
potential financial Impact
There is little evidence on whether profiling achieves savings, but there are 
indications that private payers believe that profiling has been financially 
worthwhile. GAO reported that one purchaser it interviewed said that the 
premium for its plan that had a network that included only the most efficient 
physicians was 3 to 7 percent lower than the premiums for its plans that 
included all physicians. In another example, GAO reported that spending 
growth fell for a purchaser that restructured its plan’s network. The Greater 
Rochester Independent Practice Association (GRIPA) reported a drop in 
emergency department visits and cost growth below the community trend 
after they began providing feedback to their physicians about how their 
individual practices compared to the average GRIPA physician.18
Whether profiling would achieve savings or slow spending growth in 
Medicare is not known. The design features of CMS’s planned efforts or 
the provision in H.R. 3162 have not been specified. The Congressional 
Budget Office, which is responsible for determining the budget effects of all 
legislation, did not attribute any savings to the profiling provision in H.R. 
changing medicare to tie financial incentives 
to the efficiency of care would be a funda-
mental shift in how the program interacts 
with providers.
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3162.19 Nevertheless, either of these efforts—CMS’s efforts or the provisions 
in H.R. 3162—might lay the groundwork, particularly with respect to data 
collection and aggregation, needed for a successful profiling effort.
concluSIon
CMS is moving forward with plans to engage in profiling, although the 
specifics of the initiative have not been released. The initial stage, however, 
is likely to involve providing private feedback to physicians. Even this 
step will require significant effort. Private payers and provider groups 
have attested to the difficulties inherent in compiling the data, ensuring 
its accuracy, appropriately adjusting the efficiency profiles, and enlisting 
physician acceptance of the results. 
While few would disagree with the notion that providers should be ef-
ficient in the delivery of health care services, few would agree on what 
services should be cut out to improve efficiency. Unless a profiling ef-
fort adequately accounts for differences across patients and outcomes, 
it would be criticized as inappropriately targeting particular physicians 
or high cost patients. Unless the data were shown to accurately reflect a 
physician’s practice pattern, they would be discredited as unfair. Each of 
these methodological issues alone is a high hurdle. Given the Medicare 
program’s ongoing struggles to rein in spending growth and the evidence 
on inefficient practice, however, efforts to scale these hurdles may reap 
benefits in the long run. Medicare’s involvement will be an important 
catalyst for refined data tools and methods that could benefit everyone in 
the health care arena.
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